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发表于 2026-8-24 15:29:08
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恆大債務危機|date=June 2025}}
{{lead extra info|date=October 2025}}}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2024}}
[[File:20210305 Residential buildings developed by Evergrande in Yuanyang.jpg|thumb|Residential buildings developed by Evergrande in [[Yuanyang County, Henan]]]]
[[File:Chinese real residential property prices.webp|thumb|Chinese real residential property prices]]
The '''Chinese real estate crisis''' is an ongoing [[financial crisis]] sparked by the 2021 default of [[Evergrande Group]]. Evergrande, along with other Chinese [[property developer]]s, experienced financial stress in the wake of overbuilding and subsequent [[2020–2021 Xi Jinping Administration reform spree#"Three red lines" and property sector regulation|new Chinese regulations]] on these companies' [[debt limit]]s. The crisis spread beyond Evergrande in 2021 to such major property developers as [[Country Garden]], Kaisa Group, [[Fantasia Holdings]], [[Sunac]], Sinic Holdings, and Modern Land.
Following widespread online sharing of a letter in August 2021, in which Evergrande warned the [[Guangdong]] government that it was at risk of experiencing a cash crunch, shares plunged, impacting global markets and leading to a slowdown of foreign investment in China. The company unsuccessfully attempted to sell assets to generate money, missed several debt payments, was downgraded by international [[Credit rating agency|ratings agencies]] and finally defaulted on an offshore [[Bond (finance)|bond]] at the beginning of December 2021. The ratings agency [[Fitch Ratings|Fitch]] declared the company to be in "restricted default".
At the beginning of the 2020s, thousands of [[retail investor]]s, as well as banks, suppliers, and foreign investors were owed 2 trillion [[Renminbi|RMB]] (310 billion [[USD]]) by Evergrande alone.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|title=Evergrande used retail financial investments to plug funding gaps|url=https://www.ft.com/content/0b03d4de-1662-4d30-bcfd-c9bae24fa9cc|url-status=live|access-date=2021-09-21|newspaper=Financial Times|date=21 September 2021|last1=Yu|first1=Sun|last2=McMorrow|first2=Ryan|last3=Ju|first3=Sherry Fei|archive-date=21 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210921090216/https://www.ft.com/content/0b03d4de-1662-4d30-bcfd-c9bae24fa9cc|url-access=subscription}}</ref> On 29 January 2024, a Hong Kong court ordered Evergrande to be liquidated.<ref name=":17"/>
== Background ==
[[File:Ambassador Branstad Visits Bo'ao, Hainan, 2018 (40812480475).jpg|thumb|American Ambassador to China [[Terry Branstad]] visiting a [[Bo'ao]] hospital jointly established by Evergrande and [[Brigham and Women's Hospital]], 2018]]
=== 2000s and 2010s ===
In 2005, the [[Chinese property bubble (2005–2011)|Chinese property bubble]] was growing. Average land values in China tripled by 2009, and continued to 2011, when values temporarily stopped growing. Due to fiscal reforms from previous decades, local governments had become increasingly reliant on infrastructure development to earn revenue, through [[local government financing vehicle]]s. Due to the financial benefits of selling [[land use rights]], land value became central to the financial security of local governments. The [[2008 financial crisis]] was addressed largely through local government investment in infrastructure, which further contributed to a reliance on increasing land value, despite accumulating larger and larger debts.<ref>{{Cite web|title=4. China's stimulus package|url=https://treasury.gov.au/publication/chinese-macroeconomic-management-through-the-crisis-and-beyond/2011-01-chinese-macroeconomic-management-through-the-crisis-and-beyond/4-chinas-stimulus-package|access-date=2023-08-22|website=treasury.gov.au|archive-date=3 August 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230803142611/https://treasury.gov.au/publication/chinese-macroeconomic-management-through-the-crisis-and-beyond/2011-01-chinese-macroeconomic-management-through-the-crisis-and-beyond/4-chinas-stimulus-package|url-status=live}}</ref>
Between its 2009 [[initial public offering]] and 2017 the stock price of the second largest property developer in China, [[Evergrande Group]] had outpaced the 30% growth rate of the [[Hang Seng Index]], having multiplied eightfold and it had become the world's most indebted property group in the process.<ref name=":1"/> By 2018, the central government was so concerned by the size of local government debts from land development that they announced they would not bail out creditors who were not able to be repaid.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Liu |first1=Adam Y. |last2=Oi |first2=Jean C. |last3=Zhang |first3=Yi |date=2022-01-01 |title=China's Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/717256 |journal=The China Journal |language=en |volume=87 |pages=40–71 |doi=10.1086/717256 |s2cid=244934275 |issn=1324-9347 |access-date=22 August 2023 |archive-date=9 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220109202250/https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/717256 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
==="Three red lines" rule, 2020===
{{Main|Three red lines}}
In 2020, [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]]'s [[General secretaryship of Xi Jinping|leadership]] started to tighten the real estate market based on the principle that "[[houses are for living, not for speculation]]."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York |author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=161}} He had previously made this statement during the [[19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|19th CCP Congress]] and it became the basis of the [[three red lines]] rule.<ref name=":Zhang">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001}}</ref>{{Rp|page=73}} The rule regulated the [[Leverage (finance)|leverage]] taken on by developers, limiting their borrowing based on the following metrics: [[Debt-to-capital ratio|debt-to-cash]], [[Debt-to-equity ratio|debt-to-equity]], and [[Debt ratio|debt-to-assets]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hale |first1=Thomas |last2=Yu |first2=Sun |date=10 November 2020 |title=China economy: will hot property market threaten post-pandemic rebound? |newspaper=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/c1144ffe-30f9-41d3-b033-bb82eca258b4 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=2021-09-21 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210921111524/https://www.ft.com/content/c1144ffe-30f9-41d3-b033-bb82eca258b4 |archive-date=21 September 2021}}</ref>[[File:SZ 深圳 Shenzhen 寶安 Bao'An |
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